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I

INTRODUCTION
Hanna Schulte was all set to see America the Greyhound
way ••• But when [the German college student] arrived
at Dulles International Airport last week, she asked
about air fares anyway. "I had no idea how cheap the
flying is here," she sai~ ••• "I don't think I'll need
to take a bus anywhere."

This brief excerpt, although not particularly fascinating in
its revelation, is exemplitive of a far more complex aspect of
modern American economic policy. During the 1930's,

American

regulatory fervor was at its peak. Fear of a repeated economic
upheaval, like that of 1929, compounded with the exorbitant
profits 'e arned by the robber barons spawned government
intervention. Consequently, regulation was imposed upon numerous
industries, including air and bus transport.
Four decades later restrictions have been lifted not only in
the airline industry but in the intercity bus industry as well.
These changes are part of the new laissez faire government of the
late 1970's and, thus far, the 1980's. By allowing the owners of
industry and business to essentially go 'head to head', the
government has introduced very powerful market forces which
threaten to shake the stability of some of this nation's more
steadfast corporat'ions.

Those companies that first come to mind

within the transportation sector are. Greyhound and Trailways,
clearly the market leaders for the bus industry.
This paper is founded on the contention that the government,
in deregulating the airline industry, failed to take into account
the 'spillover' effects for other industries. The industry of
particular interest within this context is the intercity bus
industry.

The intercity bus industry has received very little
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notoriety with respect to airline deregulation.

In fact, it has

received very little attention altogether from both media and
academia.

There are, for instance, no definitive texts on the

industry, nor has there been a proliferation of studies conducted
with regard to industrial analysis. This is only partially
explained by the bus companies themselves, which inhibit the
degree of industrial analysis through protective proprietary
policies.
It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to analyze the
effect that airline deregulation has had on the 'intercity bus
industry.

The paper begins with a brief historical sketch for

the intercity bus industry, including a description of the
cond~tions

under regulation.

This is followed by a discussion of

the Bus Regulatory Reform Act and its effects upon the industry.
In section III, I analyze the structure of the bus industry,
placing particular emphasis on market concentration, demand, and
profitability.

This is followed by an analysis o·f the factors

responsible for the industry's financial decline.

In section IV,

I introduce evidence that suggests that the air and bus
industries are linked, which is followed by a brief historical
sketch of the airline industry.

section VI offers a comparison

of the demand demographics ' between bus and air travel.

Finally,

I conclude the paper with an empirical analysis of the effect of
airline deregulation on the demand for bus service.
achieved in two parts.

This end is

First, I demonstrate that airline

deregulation has led to a drop in the level of fares. Secondly, I
estimate the supply and demand equations for the bus industry and
demonstrate that the quantity demanded of bus travel is, in part,
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dependent upon the price ot air travel.
Before we turn to the body of the paper it is first
necessary to clarify certain aspects of the transportation
i ,n dustry.

In transportation markets, demand is spatially- or

time- located.

Furthermore, demand is assumed to be random, and

depends on availability of service.
in his paper on

According to Pablo Spiller

Quality. capacity and Regulation, transportation

II-firms supply capacity and determine location and price before
demand is realized." 2 All public transportation markets are
similar in that their product cannot be stored.

Empty seats in a

train, bus , or airplane, signify lost revenue. The marginal cost
of an additional traveler in any mode is almost neqligible, save
the cost of the meals offered in some airlines.

Therefore, un-

occupied seats in any transport mode are considered a

"dead-

weight, loss that can never be recovered. ,,3 Therefore., all
transport strives for hiqh load factors.

A load factor is

defined to be the percent of seats in a transport vehicle that
are occupied by passenqers.

Finally, it is important to

distinquish betwe"e n intramodal and intermodal competition.
Intramodal competition is that which arises between carriers of
the same industry.

Intermodal competition includes all transport

modes which are viable SUbstitutes with one another.

These

points are important to keep in mind, throuqhout the analysis of
this paper.
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II

Historv of the Intercity Bus Industrv

Introduction
..... the or~g~n of the Greyhound Lines [c.19ll] is
said to be a four-mile run between Hibbing and Alice,
Minnesota, in an open-air, seven passenger Hupmobile,
at a fare of fifte1n cents one-way or twenty-five
cents round-trip."
The first two decades of the twentieth century in America
marked a time when there was very little choice between
alternative modes of transportation.

Transportation was regarded

by many as a luxury good, explained, not py price, but by its
relative scarcity.

The dominant mode was rail travel,

supplemented predominantly by bus.

Bus transport was not

perceived by either consumer or producer, as a substitute good
for rail.

Instead, bus transport was utilized only as a means of

.

getting to the closest railway station.
By the 1920's many railroads found themselves in
disarray.

In an attempt to reduce losses,

were abandoned.

financ~al

unprofitable routes

In order to compensate for the lost revenue

along these routes, many railroad owners adopted bus transport as
a low cost alternative means of transport.

It was soon realized

that bus service need not be confined to intrastate travel, and
consequently, it became regarded as a viable means for regional
and cross country transportation.
Regulation
As the intercity bus industry grew, both financially and
geographically, government began to take interest in its
development.

The first sign of regulation began at the state
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level in Pennsylvania in 1914.

By 1930, all but two states had

imposed some form of restriction upon bus service.
The impetus behind regulation in the bus industry changed
over the years.

Initially, government was concerned about

insuring passenger safety and highway protection.
ordinances stressed this aim.

Early

However, as the industry began to

grow at an enormous rate in the 1920's, the state governments
began to focus upon the economic implications that surfaced.
There arose

concern for what the government called 'economic

stability' in the bus industry. In real terms this meant that the
government believed it was necessary to place controls on fares
and market entry.

A report published by the Interstate Commerce

Commission sums up the position of the state governments:
" ••• most ••• adopted the viewpoint that a free market
environment would result in lower load factors, higher
costs, and less reliab e and less comfortable service
at fluctuating fares."
Furthermore, they believed that by not restricting entry, new

2

firms would be unnecessarily duplicating capital which would
increase costs for the whole industry .

They feared that these

costs would eventually be transferred to the consumer.
If we take into account our current knowledge of industrial
organization, the government's fears do not appear to have been
justified.

First, if we accept the basic economic notion that

markets left to themselves will realize an equilibrium condition
that maximizes the combined surpluses of consumers and producers
alike, then the intercity bus market, one could posit, would have
been forced to price transport at the optimal rate.

Assuming

competitive market conditions (which did in fact exist at this
time both in actual and potential competition) fares would have
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been maintained at equilibrium levels.

By restricting entry into

the market, the government in effect, disrupted free market
conditions by lessening competitive forces.

In order to insure

consumer protection, the only alternative they left themselves
was the imposition of price controls.
Intercity bus service was essentially reduced to the status
of public utility and treated as if it were a regulated monopoly.
It can be argued that such policy is justifiable if large
economies of scale are inherent to the industry.

We shall see in

the following chapter, however, that this is not the case in the
intercity bus industry.
The government also failed to recognize that 'duplication of
capital' by new entrants would shift the supply curve for bus
transport out to the right.

This would have lowered fares and

increased the quantity of service available.

The government's

stance against an increase in capital in the bus industry, was in
direct reaction to what happened in the railroad industry, years
before.

The railroads had purchased and employed an excess

amount of fixed capital, resulting in a surplus of supply over
demand.

The government's mistake was in equating the cost

structures of the two industries.

The rail industry is very

capital intensive, requiring enormous sums to cover its fixed
costs.

The bus industry, on the other hand, is dominated by its

variable costs.

Elizabeth Pinkston supports this by showing that

average costs do not decrease over distance traveled (see
appendix).

It is unlikely that the increased costs (for the

industry as a whole) associated with new entrants would have been
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passed on to the consumer.

A more probable result would have

been a fare structure that more closely resembled costs.
Government did not take these points into consideration and
hence, regulations were imposed. Many states utilized regulation
in order to insure that towns were sufficiently serviced.

When

states attempted to place controls on markets that extended
outside of state borders, however, the federal government stepped
in.

In 1925, the Supreme Court ordered that states could not

exercise control over interstate bus routes.

Federal regulation,

however, was not officially imposed until a decade later with the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
The Motor Carrier Act led to over forty years of intercity
bus regulation.

It was established in the wake of the Great

Depression,in order to instill
further financial disaster.

econo~ic

stability and prevent

The Interstate Commerce Commissions'

interpretation of the act imposed restrictions on entry, exit and
pricing policies.

The Commission determined licensing of

carriers, mergers or transferrals of operating rights, and the
setting of fares and safety precautions.
According to established policy, regulatory matters
involving interstate and intrastate routes were delegated to the
federal and . state governments, respectively.

On the federal

level, the government practiced a very strict policy with regard
to entry into the intercity market.

In fact, they exercised a

form of protectionism, where applications by prospective entrants
were carefully scrutinized to determine if they posed a threat to
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the established firms:
The question, in substance, is whether the new
operation or service will serve a useful public
purpose, responsive to a public demand or need;
whether this purpose can and will be served as well by
existing lines or carriers; and whether it can be
served by applicant with the new operation or service
proposed without endangering or impairing the
operations of existing carri!rs contrary to the public
interest. (emphasis inserted)
The terms of firm exit, on the other hand, were quite flexible.
The same held true for established terms of schedule frequency.
On the state level, however, strict ordinances often barred exit
from intrastate routes.

This hardline policy, characteristic of

most states, is best explained by political motives.

If service

was lost in any region, the governor would eventually be held
responsible by those individuals affected.

Thus~

the evidence

suggests that on the federal level, regulation favored the
protection of the industry, while at the state level, consumer
interests were the primary aim.
Deregulation
It was only until the late 1970's that the Interstate
Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) began to relax its entry standards.
Studies leading up to deregulation pointed out that regulation
was unnecessary and promoted inefficiency.

In 1975, Elizabeth

Pinkston completed her Ph.D. thesis on the intercity bus
industry.

She shared these same sentiments when she criticized

the current regulation:

unrestricted entry and expansion would not have a
major detrimental effect on the quality or price of
bus service and ••• on the contrary, some
improvements might be forthcoming •••• Governmental

page 10
regulation of the intercity bus transportation
industry is found to be unnece2sary to ensure
efficient resource allocation.
Furthermore, in 1981 congress declared that:
the existing Federal and state regulatory structure
has tended in certain circumstances to inhibit market
entry, carrier growth, maximum utilization of
equipment and energy resources, and opportunities for
minorities and others to enter the motor bus
industry. 6
A direct result of the growing skepticism was an increase in
the flexibility of regulatory conduct as administered by the
I.C.C •• This led to a significant abandonment of less profitable
routes by the majority of major carriers.

Those routes dropped

were characteristically ones that "did not fit in with major
highway networks connecting large urban centers. 1I5 This
abandonment was to continue into the early 1980's and reach its
peak the year following deregulation in 1982.
There were a number of factors which eventually led to the
deregulation of the intercity bus industry.

As demonstrated

above, economists in the 1970's began reappraising the efficacy
of regulation in terms of its economic efficiency.

In 1975, the

Brookings Institution published a report entitled Promoting
Competition in Regulated Markets which questioned the economic
justification of regulatory constraints in numerous industries.
In addition, the of Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations have
all been in support of deregulatory measures.

Under Carter's '

term in office a number of industries were unshackled from
governmental constraints and left to face free market conditions;
among these were the trucking and airline industries.

It was the
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deregulation in the airline industry; however; which eventually
led the managers in the intercity bus industry to push for their
own deregulation.

Greyhound and Trailways, the industry's two

dominant firms, were both very active toward this end.

In fact,

three months after airline deregulation, Greyhound submitted to
Congress,

A Proposal for

Federal Legislative Deregulation of

the Intercity Bus Industry (February, 1979).

The industry

leaders hoped to obtain the freedom to restructure routes in
order to achieve profit maximization.
The

u.s. Department of Transportation suggests an additional

catalyst for deregulation.

In their report on The Impacts of

Regulatory Reform on Intercity Bus Service references are made to
the competitive handicap that regulation has levied upon buses in
relation to other modes of passenger transport.

Particular

emphasis is made with regard to the airline industry:
Clearly, the major impetus behind enactment of the Act
was a desire to make the motor bus industry more
competitive at a time the industry was facing
increased competitive pressure from other
transportation modes. Regulatory reform in the
passenger airline industry had dramatically altered
airline fare structures on many city-pairs that motor
buses also served. without similar reform for the bus
industry, it was thought that it would be unable to
respond to these increased pressures and thus be faced
with reduced passenger loads and, presumably, less
favorable income and profit statements.
Deregulation was finally achieved in 1982 with the Bus
Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA). This act essentially liberalized
the restrictions on exit and route abandonment and eased the
restrictions on entry requirements.

The burden of proof for exit

shifted from the firm to the regulatory commission.

The Act also

removed a provision which had prevented carriers from servicing
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intermediate points.

By loosening its constraints, the functions

of the Interstate Commerce Commission were greatly reduced. The
I.C.C., " ••• was cast in the role of referee and final arbitrator
in any controversies and disputes that arise over motor bus
service. liS

Immediate Effects of Bus Deregulation
Clearly, an entire paper could be dedicated to examining the
effects of bus deregulation1 indeed, others have already achieved
this end.

It is, therefore, the purpose of this section to offer

a brief synopsis of the after-effects of the BRRA in order to
place this industry in proper perspective.

This will, in turn,

aid future analysis.
Passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform" Act has had two major
effects upon the intercity bus industry.

First, it has led to a

dramatic increase in new charter firms (class III carriers).

The

effect has not been as great in the Class I category, a market
which is dominated by market leaders, Greyhound and Trailways.
Charter firms typically require very low start-up or capital
costs, perhaps best explaining the great increase of new firms in
this section of the bus market.

Greyhound and trailways have,

nevertheless experienced a decline in their respective market
shares (Figure 1).
The BRRA has also led to a move on the part of Greyhound and
Trailways to "rationalize route structures."g

In other words,

these firms have taken advantage of the exit allowances and have
effectively restructured routes as consistent with profit

Figure 1
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maximization.
routes.

This has led to elimination of many unprofitable

Between passage of the Act in September 1982 and

september 1983, a total of 1294 service points had been, or were
proposed to be, dropped.

Sixty percent of these service points
did not have convenient access to a large urban area. 10 This
lack of service would leave a little over one million people, in
a sense, stranded (although taxi service is a viable yet very
expensive alternative form of transportation).
This route abandonment was not unique to deregulation, in
fact it began in the late 1970's· when the I.C.C. began to relax
certain market restrictions.

Between 1975 and 1984, total bus

service declined steadily with an average annual rate of
abandonment of 4.8 percent (Figure 2).

Declines in departures,

nevertheless, reached their peak in the year following
deregulation with a rate of 16 percent, 330 percent higher than
the average.

In the following year, the drop in departures fell

to 4 percent.

Furthermore, the Department of Transportation

concluded that:
In seven years prior to passage of the Act, not only
did the number [of] terminations outnumber service
initiations (by about 3.8 · to 1), but the number of
communities losing part of their service was greater
than thIlnumber gaining service (by a factor of 3.1
to 1).
After passage of the act this rate of termination more than
doubled with a ratio of 8.6 to 1.

If nothing else, this evidence

indicates that regulation was preventing some carriers from
withdrawing from certain routes, and thus preventing profit
maximization.

The Department of Transportation believes that

deregulation has had a relatively minimal effect overall, while

Figure 2

AI~

states in the SaInple ,

CornInunities Receiving ,Bus Service
1975 4000~,------------------------------------

1984

__________________________

~

~ Any Service

".00

~

aooo

..-....S .aoo
M

cp

m

o

U

.000

"a

fa

..0 '.00

! .
,o00

aoo
o

I

JG<<p'.:aP

K<,q>~h>'

Y;:<<J>''''''

K<q>"'r>l

.'<,q">:>"

1875

1979

1982

1903

1984

Year

,

ResuJar

page 14
it has facilitated a tendency toward greater market efficiency:
In sum, while there have certainly been service
losses following passage of the Bus Act, the change
in regulatory environment is not necessarily to
blame. The trend of declining service was well
underway prior to 1982. At most the Bus Act may
have permitted a rapid adjustmentl~o the level of
service the market could support.
With an understanding of the development of the intercity
bus industry we turn to a more quantitative appraisal. In the
next section we see how regulatory policy has helped shape the
current structure of the industry.
III

structure of the Intercity Bus Industry
It is the purpose of this section to describe the structure

of the intercity bus industry.

We will examine the particular

trends in market density and determine whether the degree of high
concentration that exists in the industry is justified by scale
economies. We begin this section with a general overview of the
industry.
The intercity bus industry is dominated by two vertically
integrated firms, Greyhound and Trailways.

Michael Redisch of

the ICC describes this relationship as a "lopsided duopoly.,,13
Both of these firms are responsible for the manufacture of their
own buses, which aids in the reduction of value added costs.
Greyhound alone is responsible for approximately 50 percent of
total operating revenues for all carriers, while Trailways and a
competitive fringe composed of commuter, charter and special
operation services account for the remaining 50 percent.

In

order to understand the current industrial structure, one must
first look at its origins.
The late 1920's marked a time in the bus industry when
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mergers ran rampant.

Although, restrictions were placed on firm

entry, the government allowed and even supported consolidation
.throughout the industry.

The government justified this position

by equating firm size with financial stability.

It was during

this period that the Greyhound Company emerged the dominant firm
in the industry.
In an attempt to become competitive with Greyhound, a group
of small companies united to form the National Trailways Bus
System (NTBS).

Most of the members of the

NTB~

were also tied

into rail travel, which by law restricted any sort of
transportation merger, thus, membership was voluntary.

The

members of the NTBS nevertheless enjoyed many of the benefits
that are typically attained through horizontal merger. They
shared economies of scale through joint marketing and advertising
ventures.

They also shared terminals, which greatly increased

route networks.

Most importantly the NTBS facilitated the

exchange of buses for long haul trips which allowed the passenger
to remain on the same vehicle even when passing from one
company's route to another.

This enabled the NTBS to be a viable

competitor with Greyhound for cross country travel.
After passage of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935, the
structure of the bus industry effectively remained frozen, with
internal consolidations increasing the market concentration.
Entry was severely limited until the late 1970's:
Between 1960 and 1970, the Commission [ICC] received
only 121 contested applications for new authority, and
denied 36 percent of the (55) regular route, 44
percent of the (27) charter requests, 39 percent of
the (33) special operations rI~ests, and 67 percent
of the (6) contract requests.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission began to relax its entry
restrictions in 1975, however there still existed a policy of
protectionism for the two market leaders, Greyhound and
Trailways. Between 1975 and 1977 the commission approved 87.5
percent of their applications for expansion while only approving
33 percent of those submitted by smaller carriers.

This trend

toward increased leniency on the part of the ICC can be seen by
glancing over the growth patterns in the number of bus companies
prior to deregulation (Figure 3).

From 1975 up through 1982

there was a steady increase in the number of operating bus
companies in the industry. As we will see shortly, this has led
to a decline in the concentration ratio for the industry.
With the institution of deregulation in late 1982, Congress
in essence lowered federal entry barriers.

The ICC writes,

••• actual and potential competition, rather than
regulatory decree, are now to be the primary
determina~~s of fare and service levels in the
industry.
The effect this had on the bus industry is quite apparent in the
sharp increase of firms between 1982 and 1984.

Between passage

of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act in october 1982 and October of
the following year, 54 percent of the applications for operation
along select routes were from new carriers.
Concentration
Although deregulation has had a significant downward effect
upon market concentration, the industry continues to demonstrate
a high density level.

Prior to deregulation, the industry

demonstrated very high and very consistent concentration ratios,

Figure 3
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fluctuating around 98 percent. This highly concentrated state is
primarily the result of the state and federal regulatory
practices that placed constraints on entry by new firms.
Furthermore, under regulation the existing firms were limited to
expansion via merger and acquisition.

This has led to a

condition of duopoly in most long haul markets, and even monopoly
in many light density and short haul markets.
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 ended over fifty years
of regulation which effectively froze the industry in the midst
of its evolution.

If nothing else, this act has had a very

noticeable effect upon the concentration of the industry.

I have

compiled a graph of the two-firm concentration ratios for the
last six years, reproduced here from figure 1:
~. ~ -~.
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concentration remained at a relatively constant level, between
97 and 98 percent, for the years leading up to 1982.

In the year

following deregulation, however, concentration dropped over 7
percent to 90.4 percent.

Although this figure continues to

gradually decline, it is quite clear that a very high degree of
concentration still exists.
In an attempt to better ascertain the nature of this
industry we must examine whether factors other than regulatory
decree have attributed to the high level of market concentration.
since there are very low technological barriers to entry in the
intercity bus industry, we can assume that this is not a factor
substantiating the level of concentration.

Similarly, no one

carrier exhibits a superior level of innovation or efficiency.
It is for these reasons that we must look at the cost structure
of these firms to determine whether the level of concentration
can be explained by economies of scale.
If scale

economies were inherent in the intercity bus

industry a firm might increase its capacity in order to move
lower along its average cost curve.

Therefore, up to a certain

point, the largest firm could dominate the market by charging a
lower price and selling more output than its competitors.

If

significant scale economies do exist in this industry the best
way for the government to maximize consumer benefit is to
establish a monopoly where price would be federally regulated.
A monopoly can be justified if there is a significant
decline in average and marginal costs as the quantity of service
increases.

In most regulated monopolies, fixed costs have a
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greater effect on average total costs than do variable costs.
The intercity bus industry, however, demonstrates a very high
variable to fixed cost ratio.

According to a study done by the

Interstate Commerce Commission back in 1978, 80-90 percent
carriers expenses are variable. 16

ot

a

Costs per mile actually

increase with respect to firm size.

This is explained by the

higher labor costs that are associated with larger firm size
(typically, there is a positive relationship between the size of
the firm and the length of its routes. Since longer routes demand
higher wages by drivers, larger firms incur higher labor costs).
Labor costs alone, dominate over 50 percent of the total
operating costs of Class I carriers. 17
Furthermore, the existence of hundreds of very small
companies indicates that fixed costs do not pose a very high
barrier to entry.

There is a very low capacity needed to start a

firm (in a very naive sense, one only needs to buy/lease a bus) .
Michael Redisch of the ICC confirms this notion and asserts that
there is not necessarily an inherent advantage in a larger firm:
••• Greyhound, with its extensive route and terminal
network and frequent schedules, has a higher load
factor per bus but also has higher costs per bus mile,
with no clear cut size advantage in terms of either
costs or profits. 18
The existence of scale economies in the intercity bus
industry may be justified to some degree if one takes into
account consumer service.

Increased firm size typically lends

itself to increased route networking.

Larger firms have

interconnecting stations and are able to
service.

o~fer

cross country

The more extensive a route network is, the greater is

the ease in getting from one destination to another.

Implicit in
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these advantaqes are shorter layovers, simplified ticket
purchasing and ease in baggage checkthrouqh.

Furthermore, there

is the added advantage of advertisinq economies which invariablly
favor the larqer firm.

Althouqh these are all advantaqes

experienced throuqh qreater firm size, they nevertheless do not
allow a firm to move down along its lonq-run averaqe cost curve
(an arqument could be made for scale economies in advertisinq,
however, this accounts for a very insignificant proportion of
costs.

In 1985 advertisinq expenses explained 4.5% of total

operating expenses.)19
Hiqh concentration in an industry is often the result of
economies of scale. In the intercity bus industry, however, this
does not appear to be the case.

A number of studies have

examined this question, however:
The utilization of sophisticated econometric
techniques has not revealed statisti~8llysiqnificant
scale economies in the bus industry.
This finding is supported by Elizabeth Pinkston in The Intercity
Bus Transportation Industry (1975),

Fred Fravel in "Returns to

Scale in the u.S. Intercity bus Industry" (1978), Fravel, Helen
Tauchen and Gorman Gilbert in

Economies of Scale in the u.S.

Intercity Bus Industry (1980), and Tauchen, Fravel and Gilbert in
"Cost Structure of the Intercity Bus Industry" (1983).
Furthermore, the actual passaqe of the BRRA, which granted firms
greater pricinq freedom and more lenient entry and exit policies
did not attempt to help or hinder a size class of firms.
Therefore:
••• Congress has implicitly concluded that significant
scale economies and other non-re~!atory entry
barriers do not exist for buses.
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The Demand facing Intercity Bus Service
With sufficient background as to the supply side of the
industry, we now turn to a brief examination of demand.

There

are a number of factors which demonstrate an effect upon the
demand for bus service.

Clearly, fare level$ are one of the most

significant determinants. A fare increase, (as one would expect
in most cases) leads to a decrease in the level of quantity
demanded.

Furthermore,

prices of substitute modes, in theory,

demonstrate a noticeable effect upon demand (a qualification is
made-here because this theory is tested in a later part of this
paper).

Consumer preferences are also an important determinant

of demand, however, do to its subjective nature, it is more
difficult to quantify. numerous factors which are relevant.

The

flexibility of service in some instances can be more important
than price, as is the case with most business travelers,
In choosing a mode of travel, the passenger considers
not only the fares, but also other factors such as the
time spent i~2transit, [and] the opportunity cost of
that time •••
Another important factor determining demand is the geographic
proximity of terminals to population hubs.

If a firm can offer

an extensive route network, servicing numerous intermediary
destinations, then the particular carrier will be all the more
attractive to the consumer.

Other factors determining a

consumer's preference are the level of comfort and safety offered
by a particular carrier, and the seating and luggage capacity,
which help in determining a carrier's load factor.
The intercity bus industry has a very distinct composition
of travelers.

Congress stated that a bus system

n •••

is vital to
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the transportation needs of the elderly, handicapped, and the
poor.,,23

Bus travelers typically have lower than national

average incomes and a large percentage of them are residents of
small communities and rural areas.

Young people, senior

citizens, students, members of the armed services, women and
minorities have a disproportionately high representation in this
market · than as compared with national percentages •
.In my research on the bus industry I was unable to locate
any formal assessments ' of the price-elasticity of the demand for
bus service.

In theory, however, travelers from small

communities and rural areas would tend to be price-inelastic.
This is explained because there does not exist a feasible
transportation alternative to bus service apart from the
automobile.

students and senior citizens, on the other hand,

will generally be more sensitive to price due to their
characteristically low income levels.

When one takes into

account that discounts and special scheduling are frequently
offered to the more price-sensitive demanders- senior citizens,
military personnel and students (discounts are usually offered to
students at peak transport periods like vacation breaks from
school) then one would expect the remaining demanders to be
relatively price-inelastic.

The ICC implies a degree of

inelasticity in their report on the intercity bus industry,
Unlike motor carriers of property, ••• bus passengers
were too fragmented to mount serious opposition to bus
industry proposals for general fare increases. 24
Furthermore, in an attempt to recover lost revenues during the
recession, many carriers raised fares.

Speaking before Congress,
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the chairman of the ICC confirms this notion,
fare increases have also occurred on certain routes as
the industry struggles to overcome its generally
weakened f!gancial condition resulting from the recent
recession.
Assuming the management of these firms understood the nature of
the demand function facing bus service, this quote suggests that
a price rise would lead to an increase in revenues.

This is

further evidence that the demand for intercity bus service is
relatively inelastic.
section

We examine this hypothesis empirically in

v.

Profitability
So far, we have discussed market structure in terms of
concentration and the nature of the demand function facing the
intercity bus market.

Next, we examine market performance as

revealed by the industry's profitablity.

profitability in the

transportation sector is commonly measured by a ratio of
operating expenses to operating revenues.
the operating ratio.

This is aptly called

As this ratio approaches one, the level of

profit in the industry nears zero, the industrial 'breakeven
point'.

When the ratio is less than one the industry is said to

be earning positive profits.

with this in mind, the operating

ratio for the intercity bus industry in 1970 was 90.1 percent.
By 1984 this figure had risen to 98.3 percent, demonstrating that
the industry has become less profitable (Figure 4).
Factors Attributable to Industrial Decline
I have compiled a number of explanations for this declining
profitability.

One factor is the decrease in a subsidiary

Figure 4
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operation, outside that of passenger service- package express.
Prior to the introduction of such companies as Federal Express,
Flying Tigers and the U.S. Post Office's Overnight Express, the
intercity bus industry enjoyed considerable profits in this
market.

Experts suggest that with the introduction of these new

competitors, there has been a drop in the profitablity of this
sector, since the early 1970's.

This, however, only explains

fourteen percent of the industry's total operating revenues.
Another factor which has contributed to the decline ' in the
profitability of the class I carriers (especially Greyhound and
Trailways) is the rise of charter bus service.

The Bus

Regulatory Reform Act had a tremendous impact on the growth of
charter buses, " ••• which require very low start-up or capital
costs. 1126

Resse Taylor, chairman of the Interstate Commerce

Commission, stated ·on September 25, 1984, before the Subcommittee
on Surface Transportation,
More than 2400 charter applications have been
received, and it appears th~1 more than half have been
from first-time applicants.
The growth in this particular market has resulted in increased
intramodal competition throughout the industry.

Charter bus

companies can be considered parasitic competitors, because they
have the flexibility of entering routes during peak demand and
exiting those same routes as soon as demand begins to wane.
Charter buses also have the ability to insure close to full
capacity, because their frequency of service is contingent upon
peaks in demand.

With the rise in competition within this sector

o£ the market, fares have dropped considerably, to the point
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where most firms are operating with borderline profitability. The
net result of the influx of charter services is an increase in
competitive forces both intercharterly and extracharterly which
has had a negative effect upon regular route fares.
Some officials at the ICC have attributed part of the
decline in carrier profitability to increasing insurance costs,
which have effectively raised costs across the whole bus
industry.

It is unclear whether

~he

increase in operating costs

was passed directly to the consumer in terms of higher fares, or
was absorbed in toto by the carrier.

If the costs were levied on

the consumer, one would expect a drop in the quantity of service
demanded.

If the carrier were to assume all of the costs, this would

reduce net revenues and consequently profits.

Most likely, firms

implemented a combination of the two alternatives, which would
have nevertheless resulted in a reduction in carriers' profits.
Evidence suggests, however, that the rise in insurance costs have
not had a very significant effect upon industry profits.

I have

compiled data on insurance expenditures for the years 1970-85,
obtained from the American Bus Association (see Figure 5).

After

converting the figures to real terms, there does not appear to
have been a significant increase, nor a consistent increase in
insurance expenditures.

FUrthermore, a comparison of insurance

and safety expenditures to total expenditures accounts for only
3-5 percent of total costs.
The strike at Greyhound in late 1983 and early 1984 also had
a negative effect on industry profitability. During this three
month period Greyhound was unable to offer intercity service.
The effects on profits are somewhat skewed, however. Although

Figure 5
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Greyhound suffered financial losses during this period, other
carriers such as Trailways and Carolina Coach benefited by a
dramatic increase in their demand.

Although this did not

entirely off-set Greyhound's losses, the industry was only
marginally affected.

An

additional factor contributing to the

decline in the profitability of the bus industry was the
recession in the early 1980's.

Reese Taylor confirms the effects

of the recession:
The bus industry did not fare well during the recent
recession. However, even though the improving economy
and passage of the Bus Act have not yet reversed
declining ridership and earnings, the effects of the
recession would have been more severe without the
reforms included in the act •••• [The bus industry is]
the only transportation industry that has nO~8shown
marked improvement as the economy improves.
This last statement is supported by the sharp decline in the
industry's operating ratio after 1981 (refer to Figure 4).

As

previously mentioned, many carriers attempted to regain losses,
incurred during the recession, by raising fares.

Nevertheless,

the industry's profitablity continued to slip.
Finally, the last and, I argue, most significant factor
leading to the decline in the intercity bus industry's
profitability can be attributable to increasing intermodal
competition with airlines.

Intermodal competition among public

carriers first started becoming significant around 1950, however:
.•• intercity bus firms have not participated at all in
the si~~ificant growth in total intercity travel since
1950."
From 1950 to 1982, the bus industry experienced a 2.8 percent
decline in market share when compared with all intercity transport
modes.

The automobile, although private, has decreased

approximately 3.5 percent, rail travel has shown a considerable
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decrease of 5.8 percent, and air travel has made up the
difference with an 11.2 percent increase in market share. 30
These results' alone indicate that the intercity bus industry has
lost some of its market to the airline industry.

In the

following section we develop this relationship further.
IV

Evidence for Market Link between Air and Bus Travel

Lack of

Intramo~al

competition

The absence of intramodal competition in the intercity bus
industry, offers evidence that this market is linked to the
airline industry.

In 1975, Elizabeth Pinkston concluded

that in

the bus industry, the number of carriers in any particular market
has no significant effect upon bus fares.

Thus, competitive

factors do not appear to exist intramodally. Furthermore, the
antitrust immunity which existed under regulation continues to
exist today as one of the tenets in the Bus Regulatory Reform
Act. This, in essence, permits collective discussion of fares
between firms.

In the year following deregulation in late 1983, the

major carriers assembled and formed an Ad Hoc committee
responsible for, among 'other things, establishing general fares.
One major result of this committee was to
••• replace the $99 maximum one way fare that had been
in effect for ov!~ one year with a series of new zones
peaking at $149.
In addition, the committee agreed upon a ten percent hike in
interstate fares.

It has always been Congress's objective to

insure consumer protection.

Therefore, such antitrust immunity

could only be justified by the existence of competitive forces
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outside of the bus industry.
As stated earlier, this external competition from airlines
began to arise around 1950.

It was not until the 1970's,
-

however, that bus firms began to drop their fares along routes
with which competition with airlines formally existed.

One

example of firms' reaction to this intermodal competition was a
travel package offered by the major carriers in 1976, which
included unlimited travel for a specified number of days.

This

marked an attempt at meeting the increased competition with
airlines on long hauls.

In addition,

bus firms also introduced round trip excursion fares
in markets with significant air competition. These
were priced at Ie!! than one-half the round-trip air
night coach fare.
Furthermore, although the structure of the bus industry is quite
conducive to monopolization, based on its high concentration and
antitrust immunity, firms still find it necessary to offer
discounts and incentives to its most frequent patrons.

This

suggests that competitive forces which fail to exist intramodally
are most likely to be present intermodally.
The oil Price Shock of 1979-80
If we hypothesized about the effect that the oil shock of
1979 and 1980 had upon the intercity bus industry's
profitability, one would have expected a decrease in profit
attributable to the dramatic increase in the price of one of the
industry's factor inputs, gasoline.

Examination of the actual

data, however, does not reveal an adverse effect upon the
financial status of the industry.
just the opposite conclusion.

In fact, evidence supports

Between the years 1979 and 1980,
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when the oil price shock reached its peak, the industry's
profitability actually rose significantly from its declining rate
the period before.

If the operating ratio for the airline

industry is examined during this same period, one notes quite the
opposite result; namely, domestic airline profitability declined.
This evidence suggests a possible shift in demand away from air
travel tciwards bus travel.

At this point, we have only compared

relative profitabilities of the two industries.

In order to

pursue this proposed transference of demand further, we must
compare changes in the quantity of service between these two
industries.
I have compiled two graphs depicting the change in quantity
of travel for the air and bus industries between the years 1975
and 1984 (Figures 6 and 7

r~spectively).

The units of

measurement for air travel are revenue passenger miles and the
units for bus travel are passenger miles.

The difference in

units is due to inaccessibility of data, however, both passenger
miles and revenue passenger miles give accurate indications of
fluctuations in quantity of service.
co~paring

Our interest here is not in

actual quantity of service but changes in service. The

bars depicted are not quantity totals for each year, but rather
differences between years.

Therefore, a negative value indicates

a decline in service from period A to period B. In short, the
sign and magnitude of the values indicate the slope for the
change in quantity.
with this in

mind~

we now turn to the evidence cited in the

graphs. The period of interest in this discussion is the 1979-80
oil embargo, in which the price of oil and its by-products sky-

Change in Quantity of Air Travel
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rocketed.

As we shall see later in section VII, there existed an

extreme escalation of air fares during this period, most likely
explained by the increase in the price of jet fuel.

Based on

simple price theory one would expect the quantity of air service
to decline. The evidence in Figure 6 confirms this, marking the
most significant decrease in revenue passenger miles for the
1970-85 period.

If we examine the bus industry (Figure 7),

however, just the opposite effect is observed.

The quantity of

bus service not only increased during this period but actually
reached its peak for the years 1970-85.

The author would suggest

that it is not coincidental that the airlines experienced their
worst loss in travelers while buses experienced their greatest
gain.
Th~

increase in bus passenger miles would seem to imply that

bus fares did not increase as drastically as air fares. Indeed,
bus fares did not appear to be strongly effected by the price
shock, whatsoever.

The differences in the effects can be

explained by the relative fuel efficiencies of the two
industries.

This is demonstrated in the following table: 30

__________________~p~a=s=s~e=n~q7.e~r Miles per Gallon of Motor :Fu==e=l~____
_____year___________________________________________

Intercity Buses
Airlines
G~ven

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

133

140

141

146

141

15

18

20

23

24

a single gallon of motor fuel, buses are able to provide on

average, seven times more passenger miles than airplanes.
Furthermore, buses do not use nearly as much fuel per trip as do
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airplanes.

Consequently, fuel costs have a much greater effect

upon price in the air industry than in the bus industry.
The oil price shock of 1979-80 provides an ideal opportunity
to witness a temporary shift in the demand curves facing air and
bus travel.

The movement of these curves suggests a strong link

between these two markets.
tested later in section VII.

This notion will be more rigorously
with sufficient evidence linking

the intercity bus industry to the air travel market, we turn to a
brief discussion of the Airline Industry.

V

The Airline Industry
It is the purpose of this section to briefly examine the

nature of the airline industry with particular emphasis upon the
internal effects of the Airline Deregulation Act.

It is

important to acknowledge that those policy changes that have
effectively changed the internal structure of the airline
industry have also created spillover effects, which have effected
other industries.

There is,

ther~fore,

an underlying assumption

that deregulation, although exogenous to the

bus travel, has

levied an effect upon the intercity bus industry. This assumption
will be more thoroughly tested in section VII.

This section

begins with a brief historical sketch of the airline industry and
follows with a description of those governmental restraints that
kept the industry regulated. We conclude with an analysis of the
effects that deregulation has had in the airline industry.

A. Air Transport:The Regulatory years
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The airline industry entered the commercial arena a little
over fifty years ago as an efficient means of mail transport.

In

those days most people traveled by train or automobile. The
postmaster general was particularly inspired by the potential of
air travel and went so far as to meet with the airline owners to
agree upon designated air routes for each airline. Although this
system was to benefit the consumer eventually by facilitating
convenient travel, the postmaster's methods of setting contracts
were seen as anti-competitive. This resulted in the first form of
airline regulation, the Airmail Act of 1934.

This act was

intended to maintain a competitive structure within this industry
by mandating that sealed bids be given for airmail contracts for
any given route.

Inspired in part by the growth of the industry

and the bidding procedures, price wars began to emerge:
The bidding for mail contracts became so intense that
in 1938 Eastern offered to delives themail between
Houston and San Antonio for free. 4
In that same year, congress approved the civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 which set up the Civil Aeronautics Authority. This
agency, which in two years was to be renamed the Civil
Aeronautics Board, was responsible for the implementat'ion of all
of the regulatory constraints imposed upon the airline industry.
Regulation was perceived as a means of avoiding "wasteful
duplication of capital" by many competitors, when only a few were
thought to be necessary to meet the demand.

At the same time, it

would be the responsibility of the civil Aeronautics Authority to
regulate prices so that monopoly profits would not ensue.
Federal regulation of the airline industry, not unlike that
of the bus industry, arose in the wake of financial instability
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as the government attempted to prevent a second 'Great
Depression'.

Even though passenger travel was rapidly

increasing, the fare wars that emerged from the growing
competition resulted in declining revenues for many carriers.

As

competition intensified, the prospect of wi4espread bankruptcy
inspired Congress to act.

Furthermore, there were a number of

fatal plane crashes in the early 1930's, which prompted Congress
to set up an authority that would both execute safety precautions
and monitor the industry's economic status.
. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) sought to protect existing
carriers by restricting entry. In all the years the industry was
regulated, there were 79 attempts to establish new major
airlines- all were refused.

Meanwhile, "mergers and acquisitions

reduced the number of major carriers from 16 to 10.,,35
Regulation, essentially, diverted competition from price to
service.

Congress hoped such competition would promote increased

safety throughout the industry.

Although this end was achieved,

most of the competition was directed at advertising and flight
amenities, such as in-flight meals or seating.
In the early postwar years, the CAB set air fares according
to the dominant mode of transport, rail (for first class rates).
This rate setting was flawed in that air costs, unlike that for
rail, drop considerably over distance.

ThUS, long haul air trips

were far more profitable than short haul. Years later, the board
began setting fares based on distance.

·It was not until 1969,

however, that the board was able to settle on a definitive system
by which to set fares for all markets.

The system, entitled

Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI), was based on
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industry average costs and varied according to distance.
Opponents of the DPFI, however, argued that the system
established fares that were substantially different from the cost
of service in most markets. Furthermore, factors such as market
density, (which tended to reduce average cost as density
increased) were not factored into the rate scale.
as the DPFI was,

As inefficient

firms were allowed some pricing freedom.

They

were permitted to set fares as high as 30 percent over the DPFI
and were allowed to offer discounts not exceeding 25 percent of
the set fare. 36
Beginning in the early 1970's, a wave of deregulatory fervor
began to sweep the nation. Industries such as banking, trucking,
and telephone were under careful observation.

A number of

economists began to reexamine the benefits and losses associated
with airline regulation. Many argued that regulation kept prices
artificially high.

In 1974, at the start of President Ford's

administration, rampant inflation inspired Congress to initiate a
study of inflationary forces within the federal government.

It

was generally believed that the artificial price levels in the
airline industry contributed to this effect.

Therefore, in

October of that same year, the National Commission on Regulatory
Reform was established to eliminate "federal regulations that
increased costs to the consumer.,,37

Abolishment of airline

regulation, was not certain, however, until President Carter
appointed Alfred Kahn, staunch opponent of regulation, to act as
chair of

~he

CAB.
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Deregulation and its Effects
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) was passed in late
October, 1978.

This act essentially removed the controls that

the CAB had on entry and fares.

The most immediate effect that

resulted was an increase in the intensity of competition arising
from new entrants:
Between May 1978 and May 1981 the Herfindahl index of
concentration did not increase in any category of
market and fell in most categories •••• Specifically,
69 percent of the 100 most heavily tr~xeled markets
were entered by one or more airlines.
Furthermore, the number of operating certified airlines almost
tripled between 1978 and 1984 increasing from 44 to 114. 39 This
consequently resulted in a decline in the market shares of the
pre-existing carriers.
The influx of new competitors led to a re-structuring of
airline costs.

New firms like People Express were not

constrained to union contracts as were the established carriers.
In fact, in 1982 forty percent of the formerly regulated
carriers' expenses were labor, while labor for People Express was
only twenty percent of total expenses. 40 Many of the new
carriers reduced labor costs by replacing the three man cockpit
with only two men.

In addition, the established carriers, like

United and Eastern, were tied to labor contracts which stipulated
that pilots work a maximum of 50 hours a month.

pilots employed

by new entrants, having no labor constraints, . averaged seventyfive hours per month, (fifty percent more than incumbent firms).
In an attempt to become competitive with the new entrants, the
pre-deregulation carriers were forced to reduce labor costs.
Between 1978 and 1984, employee compensations such as pension and
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insurance benefits, declined 6 percent. 4l Cross utilization of
employees further reduced costs. For instance, employees that
were once solely responsible for baggage handling, became
responsible for loading in-flight meals or even checking
passengers through at gates.
costs in many instances were further reduced at the
sacrifice of service quality.
offered to passengers.

Fewer in-flight amenities were

Furthermore, in order to increase load

factors (i.e. the number of passengers per plane), more seats
were installed in planes, thereby raising seating density.

New

entrants also demanded more flying hours per day from each plane.
with these cost reductions, new entrants were enabled to set
fares lower than the pre-existing carriers.

In an attempt to

become more competitive with these low-cost airlines, all
carriers were forced to become more efficient.

This whole

process forced fares to become more aligned with costs.
This has lead to one of the most visible effects of
deregulation, the reduction of fares.

The General Accounting

Office conducted a study in which fares were compared before and
after deregulation.

The GAO concluded that after inflation was

taken into account, fares fell by 6 percent between 1978 and
1984. 42 This study, however, did not take into account the wide
range of discounted fares that are available.

James ott, in an

article in Aviation Week and Space Technology, claimed that price
differentials have rea~hed the magnitude of 70 percent for the
same flight. 43 Business fares are often used to subsidize lower
discretionary (i.e. more price-elastic) flyers, which explains
some of this variance.

According to Harrison Donnelly in the
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October 24, 1986 edition of Editorial Research Reports, 91
percent of current travelers pay fares below the standard coach
rate.

Donnelly concluded that, "On average, discounts have

reduced fares by 63 percent.,,44 The Brookings Institution
conducted another

s~udy

that demonstrated that deregulation has

led to fare savings of up to 35 percent for flights between 2500
and 3000 miles.
As a result of the lower air fares, the quantity of air
travel demanded has increased.

Melvin Brenner, airline industry

analyst, confirms this notion (1983):
significantly, in the last four years the North
Atlantic industry load factor averaged 68 percent- an
extraordinarily high level for a four-year average for
an entire geographic region. Nevertheless, the
industry was ~lagued in that region by price wars and
discounting. 4!)
Airline deregulation has also led to an increase in
convenience for the consumer with regard to stopovers.

Before

deregulation, the CAB's authority over routes allowed it full
control over entry into industry and its submarketso

The board

kept the industry unnaturally (in retrospect) concentrated,
allowing only two or three firms in a given market.

certain

airlines were restricted to servicing regional markets while only
larger airlines, the trunks, were allowed to service major longhaul markets.
developed.

Consequently, regional and market specialization

One effect this had was to decrease consumer welfare

for those travelers that were forced to change airlines enroute,
because there was no on-line connection.

The facilitation of on-

line connections was one result of deregulation.

This had the

effect of: 1. reducing chance of lost baggage and 2. increasing
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consumer convenience (the consumer no longer has to leave the
plane to locate a connecting flight).

A study by Graham, Kaplan

and Sibley concluded that deregulation has increased passenger
convenience:
An analysis of travel patterns in a sample of more

than 4000 markets shows that the fraction of trips
that require passengers to change planes has remained
about the same since 1978, but the proportion of
passengers that must cha2~e airlines in route has
decrea~ed by 38 percent.

There are a number of conclusions one can derive from the
events following airline deregulation.

Free market mechanisms

seem to have forced fares to fall more closely in line with
costs.

The variations in pricing across submarkets appear to be

the result of the distance and time sensitlvity of passengers,
"in ways which are broadly consistent with market efficiency
criteria." 47

Furthermore, the increase in load factors since

deregulation suggests that more efficient utilization of capital
has ensued.

Finally, the trimming of excess costs, necessitated

in order to compete with new "no-frills" competitors, has forced
the airline indust.ry to become far more efficient than it had
been under regulation.

VI

Comparison of the Demand Demographics between Bus and Air Travel
In this section we compare the differences and similarities

between the demand demographics facing the airline and intercity
bus industries.

This section is important in determining to what

extent these two markets are viable substitutes.

Buses
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characteristically dominate the intercity transportation industry
with respect to the number of passenqer trips per mode. In 1982,
for instance, buses were

respon~ible

for 390 million trips while

airlines accrued a total of 275.8 million. 48 Furthermore, buses
are also responsible for carryinq the qreatest number of
passenqers a year.

In 1981, buses carried 375 million

passenqers, whereas airlines were responsible for 276.8 million
and Amtrak, only 20.6" million.
airlines clearly dominate

When comparinq distance traveled,

interci~y

travel. Airlines accumulated

202.1 billion passenger miles in 1981, followed by buses at 26.9

billion and Amtrak at 4.8 billion. 49
The Data used in this section was compiled from the National
Travel Survey, li11 Census Q! Transportation.

I investigated

extensively in search of a more recent study, however, officials
at the Bureau of the Census claimed that due to financial
constraints, future statistical compilations of this variety have
been discontinued.

Although these statistics are already nine

years old, a report published in 1984 which utilized some of the
data claimed,
••• most of the bus companies we con~acted confirmed that
the characteristics of their bus ~5ssenqers have not
changed significantly since 1977.
Based on this finding I make the same assumption for air
passengers.

Lastly, the Census of Transportation study surveys

"non-local trips" which is defined as trips in excess of 100
miles in length. This would tend to exclude commuters from the
study, thus the data offers a viable assessment of intercity
travel.
When comparing the family income levels of travelers, there

· Figure 8
Choke of Mode According to lncome
F......ILy ItC)ME lJtI)ER $10.000

-

;;;;

Figure 9
Choke of Mode According to lncome
FAMILY INCOME CN£R $1~ggg
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appears to be a large differential between those that choose
between air and bus transport. This evidence is supported by the
following table:

Income Classification of Intercity Travelers by Mode in 1977
(percent of person-trips)
Family Income

Bus

Air

Auto*

Auto**

Rail

Total

Bus-Air

.1

6.5
6.1
6.2
20 . 6
18.8
- 0.9
15.8
16.2
22 . 4
12.0
33.9
1.4
3.5
7.7
"1~. "
Note: Columns in table may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
* Auto/truck trips without camping equipment.
** Auto/truck trips with camping equipment.

Under $5000
$5000 to $7499
$ 7500 to $ 9999.
$10000 to $14999
$15000 to $19999
$20000 to $24999
$25000 to $49999
$50000 and over

19.3
12.2
8.4 _
20.4

~

4.8
3.9
!2 Q
14.7
13.8

6.4
6.2
6.1
21.6
19.7
15.9
21.1
3.0

4.6
4.9
7.2
23.7
19.5
17 .9
19.9
2.3

14.5
8.3
3.4
5.7
1.5
- 5.3
-21. 9
-6.3

9.9
6.5
5.4
15 . 3
13.5
13 . 5
30 . 5
5.4

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the c'ensus, 1977 Census of
Transportation. National Travel Survey, Report TC77-N-2, Tables 3G,3E,3I.

In order to illucidate this point further, I have compiled two
graphs representing the choice of mode according to family
income.

Figure 8

demonst~ates

that travelers with a family

income below $10,000 have a greater propensity to choose bus
travel over the other two means of public transportation.

In

Figure 9 we note just the opposite effect as income exceeds
$19,999. In this income range air travel clearly dominates

consumer choice over bus service by 25.5 percent.

Within the bus

industry, more than 60 percent of the travels have below median
income of $16,009, whereas in the airline, industry , more than 60
percent of the travelers have income above the median level.
This evidence suggests that as travelers' income level grows,
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there is a greater tendency to substitute air service for bus
service.
It is important to note that since airline deregulation,
changes in the fare structure in the airline industry have made
air travel more affordable to low income groups. since this data
was compiled in 1977, the year before deregulation, it is likely
that certain airline demographics have noticeably changed in
favor of an increased number of low income travelers.
When comparing the age distribution of travelers with
respect to transport mode, one notices a divergence between bus
and air passengers (Figures 10 and 11).

Passengers under the age

of twenty-five compose 47.1 percent of the total bus travelers.
In the airline industry, this age group only comprises 16.6
percent of total travelers.

The middle age group, between 25 and

64, explain approximately 76 percent of airline passengers while
representing only 36 percent of the bus travelers.

Finally, 16.4

percent of bus passengers are sixty-five years or older, as
compared with 6.8 percent for airlines.

These results are
demonstrated graphically on the following page. 5l
One may notice that these pie charts (Figures 10 and 11»
are conspicuously similar to those on the previous page (Figures
8 and 9).

This is attributable to the fact that income and age

are not mutually exclusive.

The majority of

ai~line

passengers

lie between the ages 25 and 64, which include a large portion of
business travelers and professionals who undoubtedly have higher
than median incomes.

Conversely, the majority of bus

passengers are either below the age 25 or above the age 64. These
patrons comprise the lower income sector of the population.

Figure 10
kJe Distribution of Passengers by Mode
PASSENGERS UNDER 25 JHl evER M

a,.

Figure 11
Age Distribution of Passengers by Mode
PASSENlERS BE1WEEN lHE AGES 25

AN)

64

(51.~)

page 42
Furthermore, there appears to be a significant difference in the
sex of air and bus passengers. sixty-one percent of bus
passengers are female, as compared with 36.9 percent for
airlines.

One can argue that sex, too, is correlated with

income.

For example, in 1977 the median income for male workers
per week was $253 while that for females was only $156. 52 Based
on these results the greatest substitution between air and bus
travel would occur between the income and age margins.

This

would mean that competition between the two industries is
strongest for passengers within the annual income range of
$10,000 and $20,000 (I calculated estimates for 1985 to be
between $11,200 and $22,400), and passengers within the age
ranges of 18 to

~4

years and 55 to 64 years.

We conclude this section with an examination of the distance
substitution between air and bus travelers.

For the intercity

bus industry, the median trip is a little over 400 miles while
the median for domestic air flights is well over 1,000 miles in
length.

In 1981, the average bus trip length was 72 miles while

that for airlines was 730 miles. From these simple statistics
alone, one is able to witness yet another clear divergence in
demand demographics between these two industries.

Bailey,

Graham, and Kaplan identify the distance substitution between bus
and air travel:
As market distance increases, surface travel becomes a
poor substitute for air travel. Since air travel is
almost always faster, the total cost of air
transportation will be less for individuals who place
a high value on their time. In short-haul markets,
where the time savings of air travel are relatively
small, airlines tend to specialize in serving
travelers who place a high value on time~ At longer
market distances air travel demand be~~mes less
sensitive to air service convenience.
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These conclusions are supported by data from the National Travel
Survey.

I have compiled two graphs demonstrating the

distribution of travelers with respect to distance for air and
bus travel (Figures 12 and 13). It is clear that buses dominate
short hauls whereas airlines pre-dominate over long hauls.
According to the study, 71 percent of round-trip bus travel is
less than 600 miles in length.

This same distance for airplanes

explains only 13 percent of all trips.

If we compare longer

hauls, only 17 percent of bus travel is 800 miles or greater, as
compared with 67 percent for airplanes.

The civil Aeronautics

Board recognized airlines' competitive disadvantage in short
hauls and consequently:
••• the Board deliberately set fares below costs in
markets of less than 400 miles so that air
. transpgitation would be more competitive with surface
modes.
According to our results, the greatest substitution between modes
would tend to occur at the margins, that is, somewhere between 400
and 1000 miles (see Figure 13b).
In this section we have examined and compared some of the
demand demographics facing the air and bus industries.

The

results demonstrate a clear divergence between the
characteristics of the demand for bus travel and the demand for
air travel.

These differences are not absolute, however.

In

each category there exists a considerable degree of overlap.

For

instance, while it is clear that buses cater to lower income
travelers and airlines service those of a higher income category,
it is not clear which mode dominates those consumers that lie in
between these categories.

It is these consumers that are of keen
43
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interest when comparing the substitutability between markets.

In

the following section we continue this analysis using a more
empirical approach to determine if airline deregulation has had
an effect upon the intercity bus industry.
VII

Analysis: Airline Deregulation - the spillover effects
This section of my paper is dedicated to an empirical

analysis of the competitive relationship between the air and bus
industries.

We will examine the effect that the Airline

Deregulation Act has had upon the airline industry and then
examine to what degree this has effected its next closest
competitor, the intercity bus industry.
It is my aim to test two hypotheses:
1. Airline Deregulation has led to a fall in the price of
air service
2. A change in the price of air service will alter the demand
for bus travel.
A. Airline Deregulation and its effect upon Price
We begin our analysis with the airline industry.

Before

Deregulation, the airline industry annually demonstrated a low
operating ratio (operating costs/operating revenues).

This is a

very good indication that there existed a high profit level
throughout the market.

Based on economic theory, one would have

expected these profits to have been bid away by new competitors
as they entered the market.

This did not occur, however, because

there existed very high and, in fact, insurmountable barriers to
entry in the form of federal regulation.

Thus, theory suggests

that 'removal of these barriers would lead to an influx of
competitors up to the point at which economic rent can no longer
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be earned. This would in effect shift the supply curve out to the
right, increasing the quantity of air service and lowering its
price (see figure 14).
In order to test whether the empirical evidence supports
this theory, I examine the trends in price, quantity and
concentration beginning with 1970.

In order to facilitate this

discussion, I have compiled three graphs.

The first graph,

Figure 15, depicts the change in quantity of domestic air travel
over time.

The units for quantity are measured in revenue

passenger miles, which is simply defined as the distance traveled
multiplied by the number of revenue paying passengers on each
flight.

This data represents annual compilations from Air

Carrier Traffic statistics under the category of domestic trunk
carriers.

As one can clearly see, there was a considerable

increase in the quantity of air service between December 1977 and
December 1979.

This observation supports our hypothesis.

Next we look at the change in airline prices over time.

I

have arbitrarily chosen the fares for two major markets over the
period 1976-1984.

These markets link Chicago-Miami, and New

York-Miami, respectively.

These prices were extracted from the

Official Airline Guide for the months July and December during
the 1976-1984 period.

These months were chosen in conjunction

with their common destination, Miami, in order to define a market
that is predominantly composed of vacation travelers.

This

market specification was made in order to insure routes which
would be most competitive with the demand demographics for
intercity bus travelers.
Brief inspection of both of Figures 16 and 17 yield a

Figur e 14
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similar trend in the movement of air fares over time. In both the
Chicago/Miami and New York/Miami markets, prices increased at a
relatively constant and modest rate until July 1979 (Note: it
should be mentioned that the data collection has been limited to
the months December and July, therefore any references made
toward a trend from one period to the next does not mean to imply
that the month mentioned marked the most significant change in
price). The sudden increase in fares in July 1979 can be
attributable to the increase in costs resulting from the 19791980 oil price shock.

I have included a graph charting the path

of the price of jetfuel over time (Figure 18).

The price of

jetfuel effectively sky-rocketed, increasing 230 percent, between
1978 and 1981.

Based on this knowledge, and the fact that

airline cost structure is largely determined by the cost , of fuel,
one would have expected airline fares to follow in the same
increasing trend.
events.

This expectation is refuted by the reality of

In the chicago/Miami market, 'air fares plummeted between

July and December of 1980, when fuel prices were nearing their
peak.

Similarly, in the New York/Miami market, prices fell

remarkably between December' 1979 and December 1980.

Based on the

assumption that there would be a lag between the imposition of
deregulation in 1978 and its consequential effects, the data
appears to suggest a cause and effect relationship"

The extreme

decline in airline fares, contrary to the rise in the price of
fuel, supports our initial hypothesis that airline deregulation
has led to a decline in' the price level.
Finally, we conclude this analysis with an examination of
the trends in airline market concentration.

I derived

Figure 18
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concentration ratios by dividing the Revenue Passenger Miles for
the top four domestic trunk carriers by the industry total
(domestic).

These statistics were obtained from annual

publications of Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, compiled by the
Civil Aeronautics Board for the years 1970 to 1984 (when the CAB
was retired).

Data for the year 1985 was obtained from the Air

Transport Authority annual industry report.
From Figure

19;~

we can see that there has been a consistent

trend toward a less concentrated industry ever since 1970.

There

does appear, however, to be a significant drop in concentration
after 1978, the year in which deregulation was instituted.

To

test whether this change is statistically significant, I ran a
simple regression with 'revenue passenger miles' as the dependent
variable, and 'concentration' as the independent variable.

In

addition, I included a dummy variable for the years following
deregulation in order to evaluate the significance of this
period,
where,

0 ...
0 =

0, for years 1970-1977
1, for years 1978-1985

RPM
= Revenue Passenger Miles
CONC
= Four firm concentration ratio
O*CONC = Dummy variable x CONC
The following results were obtained,
RPM

=

14.249
(.331)

- 4.399 CONC
(.576)

+ .544 O*CONC
( • 084)

SER = .054

OW

Standard Error

= 1.15

Given the following model,
RPM = Bo + B1 CONC + B2CONC*O
we now test the hypothesis that market concentration decreased at
a significantly faster rate than prior to airline deregulation.
In short, we are testing whether B2 is significantly greater than
zero.

The null hypothesis is constructed as follows,

Figure 19
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HO : B2

~

0 •

This implies that there is either no change in slope or that the
slope decreases.

conversely, the alternative hypothesis states

that the slope increases,
Hl : B2 > 0 •

From the derived t-statistic for the dummy variable (6.45), we
reject the null hypothesis and conclude with 99% confidence that
there has been a statistically significant drop in the level of
concentration in the domestic airline market.

It is interesting

to note that if we switch the years of our analysis to the period
prior to deregulation, the dummy variable assumes at-statistic
of -6.45.
Given our conclusions about market concentration, we now
focus upon its impact on airline fares.

For the purpose of this

discussion we refer to an article by Graham, Kaplan and Sibley on
the "Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry".

This

article, published in 1983, concluded that concentration has a
,

significant and positive effect on air fares (Figure 20).
Figure 20
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Placed in the context of our current analysis this indicates
that a significant fall in market concentration will place
downward pressure on the price of air travel.

Therefore, based

on the evidence given above I conclude that Airline Deregulation
has led to decline in the price level of air travel.
Cross Substitutability of Markets
Having completed our analysis of the airline industry, we
now turn our attention to the intercity bus industry.

It is the

purpose of this section to examine whether the air and

~us

markets are linked by price.
following hypothesis:

In short, we are testing the

an increase (decrease) in the. price of air

service will increase (decrease) the demand for bus travel.
We begin our analysis by estimating the supply and demand
. functions for the intercity bus industry.

The dependent variable

for both equations is passenger-miles which acts asa proxy for
quantity.

This data was obtained from the Interstate Commerce

Commissions' Office of Transportation Analysis.
equation is composed of three independent

The demand

varia~les,

the price of

bus service,the price of air service, and the personal
disposable income per capita,
OD = f(P bus ' Pair' Y)
The consumer price index for intercity bus travel is used as a
proxy for the price of bus service. The consumer price index for
transportation modes is based on the average price per mile. The
same source is responsible for the proxy for the price of air
travel. Data for personal disposable income per capita is in
nominal terms and was obtained from the 1986 edition of the
Economic Report of the President.
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The supply equation is composed of two independent
variables, the price of bus service, and the price of gasoline,
QS = f(P bus ' Pgas )
The Producer Price Index for gasoline was used as a proxy for the
price of gasoline.

When estimating these simultaneous equations

we assume that the market is always in equilibrium.
Qt* = QtO = QtS

That is,

Two-stage least-squares estimation was utilized in order to
eliminate the correlation of the price of bus service with the
error term.

In determining the exogenous variables used for this

analysis, I estimated both the supply and demand equations for
the airline industry. The results of these estimations can be
found in the appendix. The following exogenous variables are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the error terms in both
regressions and thus, were used as instrumental variables for
this estimation process: personal disposable income per capita,
the consumer price index, the producer price index for gasoline,
and the concentration ratio for the airline industry.

Personal

disposable income is considered exogenous because economic
changes in the bus market have a negligible effect on the economy
as a whole.

Similarly, the consumer price index accounts for so

many factors that changes in the price level of bus service have
a negligible effect upon this index.

The intercity bus industry

accounts for less than 1% of the gasoline consumption for motor
vehicles in the United States, therefore changes in its demand
for gas will have an almost imperceptible effect upon the price
of gas. 57
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Finally, the concentration ratio for the airline industry was
used as an instrument because, in theory, chanqes in the market
structure of the airline industry will be both external to the
bus market and will indirectly effect the price of bus service
throuqh the price of air.
allows

Inclusion of these exoqenous variables

the two equations to be identified.

The natural loqarithm was computed for all the variables in
order to achieve two ends: 1. to remove the qrowth over time of
the variance of the data and

2. to estimate elasticities of the

independent variables by convertinq the data into homoqeneous
units.
Results
The fo1lowinq are the variables used to define the model,

= Total intercity bus passenqer-miles, annual
Pbus = Consumer Price Index for intercity bus travel
Pair = Consumer Price Index for air travel
Y = Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal
G
= Producer Price Index for qasoline

Q

Bus

Demand

loq Q = -6.664

. (70036)

-~oq . PbUS

+ .473 lO.q Pair + 1.2 loq Y

~

( • 869)

(.317)

SER = .045
OW = 1.61
Q = 3.26
Frequency: Annual
Period: 1970-1985
Bus Supply
loq Q = 3.110

( .128)

.0411oq Pbus + .065loq G

(.035)

(.053)

SE

SER = .035
OW =2.04
Q =3.26
Frequency: Annual
Period: 1970-1985
Between these two reqressions, the one of particular
interest in our discussion is the demand equation.

The price

SE
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elasticity for bus demand is determined to be -.663, which is
consistent with the theory of the downward sloping demand curve.
It is interesting to note that this number represents a
relatively price-inelastic curve.

This may be explained by the

constant proliferation of student and elderly discount vouchers
by Greyhound and Trailways in an attempt at discriminating the
more price-sensitive travelers.

The t-statistic for this

variable is -1.40, which is statistically significant at the .20
level.
According to the results, the demand for bus
income-elastic (1.2).

~ervice

is

In other words, a small rise in personal

disposable income yields a larger increase in the quantity of bus
service demanded.

Assuming that bus service is a normal good,

this finding is also consistent with economic theory.

This

result is statistically significant at the .20 level.
We now turn to the variable of salient interest in this
paper, the price of air service.

The elasticity estimate for

this variable is .473, which indicates that the demand for bus
service is relatively inelastic with respect to air fares.

The

t-statistic for the price of air service is 1.49, which is
statistically significant at the .20 level.

The coefficient of

this term is positive, confirming the expectation that a price
rise in air service leads to a rise in the quantity demanded of
bus service. This is also consistent with the theory of crosssubstitutability of goods.

What is most important in this

discussion, however, is not the effect of a price rise, but
rather the effect of a price drop.

This model appears to confirm

the hypothesis that a drop in the price of air service will lead
to a drop in the quantity of bus service demanded.
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Before we conclude this section, we synthesize our findinqs
to determine the effect that derequlation has had on the
intercity bus industry.

The Airline Derequlation Act essentially

opened up the industry to new entrants.

Increased competition

forced the price level to decline, which increased the quantity
of air service demanded.

This led to a decrease in the demand

curve facinq the bus industry.

This is qraphically represented

in Fiqure 21, as the shift from Demandold to Demandnew. In an
attempt to eliminate unprofitable routes, thereby trimminq
losses, the supply of bus service shifted up and to the left.

This is

graphically represented as the shift from supplYold to supplynew •
An additional supply curve is included, SupplYalternate' because

some firms, as reported by the ICC, attempted to raise fares in
an attempt to recover lost revenues from the recession.

The

overall effect has been a relatively insignificant change in the
price level of bus service, but a considerable loss in the
quantity of bus service demanded.

VIII Conclusion
The intercity bus industry has seen increased competition
both intramodally and intermodally.

The former was a result of

derequlation within the industry itself, and had little impact
upon the financial status of individual carriers.

The increase

in intermodal competition, which arose as a consequence of the
new low-fare airlines, has had a profound effect on the bus
industry.

Through our analysis we have determined that the

Figu re 21

Cross Substitution Effect of Airline Deregulation
upon the Intercity Bus Industry
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Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did, in fact; create 'spillover '
effects with regard to the bus industry.

Although there are a

number of factors which have contributed to the bus industry's
decline, I would suggest that none have been as injurious to the
industry as airline deregulation.
Based on statistical evidence of the demand demographics of
these two industries, airlines and buses appear to service very
different divisions of the population.

Buses dominate short

distance routes while airplanes predominate over longer hauls.
Furthermore, there is a considerable divergence between the
income categories of these modes, where buses and airlines,
respectively service the lower and higher income

gr~ups.

same sort of relationship exists for age classification.

This
Closer

examination of these differences, however, reveals that there
exists a large area of substitution between these demand
categories.
Survival of the bus industry along major intercity routes is
to a large degree dependent upon the performance of the airline
industry.

Strong evidence suggests that the industry is tending

toward a more concentrated state.
mortality rate among new entrants.

There appears to be a high
For evidence toward this end,

one need only cite the recent acquisition of People Express or
the financial collapse in late August, 1986 of Frontier Airlines
Inc., for evidence toward this end. Daniel F. May, president and
chief executive officer of Republic Airlines, believes that the
major reason for this high failure rate is that the current fares
do not reflect carrier's cost structures:
If they were pricing their product correctly, they
-would be making money; Instead, a lot of them are
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going out of business. 54
Furthermore, Melvin Brenner, airline economist, believes that the
airline fare wars will not persist much longer.

He cites such

examples as the $99 New York-California fare as "absurdities"
which are " ••• grossly inadequate to cover cost, even at a 100
percent load factor. II55

It is for these reasons that ex-CAB

chairman Alfred E. Kahn believes that the industry will become
more concentrated in the future:
All these things make it impossible to say with
confidence that the industry is not already evolving
into an uncomfortably tight oligopoly.
A more concentrated airline industry would limit the degree
of competition within markets.

One consequence this might have

would be to raise the price level of current air fares.
Depending on the extent of the increase, this could allow the
intercity bus industry to regain a portion of its lost market
share.

Furthermore, a

decre~se

in competition in the airline

industry might lend itself to a decrease in consumer convenience.
This would make bus travel a more attractive option to consumers.
It is unlikely, at least in the near future, that any major
upheaval in the airline's current status will ensue .

After the

period of experimentation that followed the passage of the ADA,
and the turbulence caused by the oil price shock of 1979-80, the
industry is in need of stability.
There is a glimpse of hope for renovation within the bus
industry, however.

In January of this year, Fred G. Curry,

former head of Trailways, acquired Greyhound Lines.

This

transfer of management may facilitate the renegotiation of labor
contracts in the future.

If this end is pursued it is probable
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that the reductions in cost will allow Greyhound, and force other
carriers, to price fares at levels that are more competitive with
airlines.

Not too suprisinqly, Greyhound employees are dreadinq

such cuts,

Lately Greyhound drivers had taken to wearinq their
corporate-emblem pins upside down. perhap~6a fresh
start will qet the hound back on its feet.
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APPENDIX A
Regression Results of Intercity Bus costs*

Variable

Coefficient

T-statistic

cost per bus-mile
(dependent variable)
Bus-miles
Constant

-.83 x 10- 8
83.9

-.068
12.46

R2 = .0001

*Reproduced from Ph.D. Thesis, The Intercity Bus Industry, by
Elizabeth Pinkston, 1975.
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APPENDIX B

Supply and Demand Egyations for the Airline Industry
Variables used:

= Revenue Passenger Miles for domestic air flights.
= Producer Price Index for Jetfue1.
= Concentration Ratio for domestic air industry, derived by

RPM
JET
CONC

=
=
Pbus =

Pair

y

dividing the revenue passenger miles for the top four firms
by the total for the whole domestic industry.
Consumer Price Index for domestic air travel.
Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal.
Consumer Price Index for intercity bus travel.

Instrumental variables:
CONC
Y

JET
CPI

= Consumer

Price Index

supply Equation
RPM
RPM

..

=

lO.593
(2.57)
ll.99

+ .l02 JET - .954 CONC + .336 Pair
(.080)
(2.786)
(.220)
S.E.

DW = l.22

Frequency: Annual

SER = .094

Period: 1970-l985

Demand Equation without bus price
RPM

=

";'9.647 + 2.206 Y + .270 Pair
(3.74l)
( .443)
(.065)
S.E.

RPM = ll.99

DW = l.57

Frequency: Annual

SER = .059

Period: 1970-1985

Demand Equation with bus price
RPM

=

-6.4l6
(7.66)

DW = l.46

+ l.805 Y
( .943)

SER =.058

+ .l25 Pair
( .305)

+ .225 Pbus
( .462)

S.E.

APPENDIX C
Inclusion of I>uJumy Variable for Price of Air in Bus Demand Equation

The following are the variables used to define the model,
= Total intercity bus passenger-miles, annual
Pbus = Consumer Price Index for intercity bus travel
Pair = Consumer Price Index for air travel
y
= Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal
G
= Producer Price Index for gasoline
D = Dummy variable for Deregulation
where,
for years 1970-1977
D = 0
D = 1
for years 1978-1985

Q

DPair = Dummy variable multiplied by the price of air travel
Bus Demand
log Q - -2.68 - .663 log Pbus + .473 log Pair + .469 log Y + 2 . 467 D - .488 DP air
(6.28)

SER

=

.046

(.525)

DW

=

Frequency: Annual

(.539)
2.15

Q=

(.761)

(1.36)

( .263 ) SE

3.26

Period: 1970-1985

In order to test whether these results are significantly
different from our original equation, the following F-test was
performed:
>

F

2,n-6'

Where,
zero,

The null hypotheis is that the dummy variables are equal to
Ho : D = 0

The alternative hypothesis is that the dummy variables are
not equal to zero,
Ha : D

=0

Computation shows that the derived F-statistic is not greater
than F-critical,
.7158

<

4.10

Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was no
change in the slope and intercept of the demand curve after
deregulation.

·--

-_ .. .. ..- .._-- ,---
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APPENDIX D
DATA USED FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Year
l21Q

illl
1972

l2ll
1974
19Z5

.l2.Z9.

1977
1918
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
.cw12

Bu§PasMil
23,3
25,3
25,5
25,6
26,4

2l...J..
25,4
25,1
26,0
25,6

2l...J..
l2.....2.
26,9
26,S
27,1
25,S

CPIBus DPPerCap

lli..Q
136,1
140,1
145,7
l2.l....Q
J.M...Q

llU
223,5
243,3

~

310,1

lli...l

377,7
405,5
455,4
486,6

8134,0
8322,0
8562,0
9042,0
886Z,O
8944,0
9115,0
9J81,O
9Z35,O
9829,0
2723,0
9Z73,O
9Z32,O
9952,0
10427,0
10504,0

CPIAiI

PPIGas Concet:lt

119,4
lll.....§.

104,0
100,9

ill....1

lQL.l

134,7
145,9
ill....Q
112,2
~

188,8
232,1

.

,615
,589
,585

230,3
203,2

......2l2.

lli...2

~

263,1

,560

llU
lliL.1

...22l

~

499,4
641,1

lli...L

llL.1

408,8
428,5
456,2
485,0

ru.!:

654,2
58Z,6
554,5
569,9

,565

,560
,540

.....221.
,499
,500
,507

...!l2..a
,480

AirRPM

Jetfuel

CPI

104,2
106,3
118,1
126,J
129,7
JJ1,7
131,4
141,3
181,0
203,2
198,2
200,9
210,1
226,5
234,1
257,7

~

116
121
125
133
148
161
171
182
195
217
247
272
289
298
311
327

,82
,82
,97

l.....2l
2....ll.
2,39
2,75
3,05
4,16
6,78

l......2li
L.ll
6,02

~

5,82
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